In the 1970s some of us endlessly debated theories of the state. The Once again we are increasingly part of the same conversation. We are driven by a common desire to understand what makes for effective governments and how to build them. Effective government is one that not only protects its citizens from violence but also promotes economic growth, supplies the public goods the populace needs and desires, develops mechanisms of popular accountability, and ensures relative political and economic equity. The most effective governments are probably in democracies, but not all democracies have effective governments, and there are relatively effective governments in non-democratic states.
Most political scientists now acknowledge the importance of this perspective, but it nonetheless helped precipitate twenty years of divergence between historical and new economic institutionalists. 3 Once again we are increasingly part of the same conversation. We are driven by a common desire to understand what makes for effective governments and how to build them. Effective government is one that not only protects its citizens from violence but also promotes economic growth, supplies the public goods the populace needs and desires, develops mechanisms of popular accountability, and ensures relative political and economic equity. The most effective governments are probably in democracies, but not all democracies have effective governments, and there are relatively effective governments in non-democratic states.
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We have made considerable progress as social scientists in identifying the key components of both effective and ineffective government. We have excellent descriptions and even good equilibrium theories to account for stability. We know quite a lot about why states fail and about the conditions that cause them to unravel. We are increasingly expert at explaining post hoc why some governments, performing so well on so many dimensions, suddenly fall apart. Think Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, or even the Soviet Union. But how do we build them back up? How do we improve those (nearly all) that need improvement?
What we lack is a dynamic theory, one that demonstrates how to go from ineffective to effective government, how we move from a problematic equilibrium to one we prefer.
How do we generate governments that promote economic growth, relative equality, and political equity? 4 How do we go from low participation to high? How do we change an inequitable society to one that is just and fair? How do we end corruption and institute impartial but compassionate bureaucrats? How can we transform governments that have failed their citizens abysmally into governments that protect their citizens, provide them with health, education, infrastructure and other public goods? And how can we transform democratic governments with advanced economies that serve some of their citizens very well and most of their citizens very poorly into democratic governments with advanced economies that serve all of their citizens equally well?
If the story is all in structure, geography, demography, initial conditions, path dependence and exogenous shocks, then perhaps we should simply sit back and let history take its course. 5 But to say that there are constraints and that some of those constraints are quite rigid is comparable to describing human mentality as only hard
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wiring. Humans learn, and so do societies. When a combination of individuals with the incentives and imagination to figure out how to operate better within or even to overcome the status quo, we observe institutional transformation and creation. Trade cartels, bureaucracies, universities, and courts are just a few of the myriad examples of the institutions human beings build.
My emphasis is decidedly on the construction of government that performs well for the polity as a whole. I draw on a wide range of analyses of institutions and organizational governance as well as on significant research on protest and resistance.
Others whose work I avidly consume focus on social capital, civic engagement, and social norms-claimed as essential elements for enhancing cooperation within civil society and for producing better government. Although I argue that the causal arrow is more likely to go from government to civic engagement than vice versa, the question of the relationship between civil society actors and government remains intellectually fruitful. Indeed, I believe a theory of consent-or at least compliance-is a necessary element of any reasonable theory of effective government. If the populace-or at least enough of the populace-cannot minimally express support, the government is likely to flounder. But I also want to stress the importance of the combination of governmental institutions and leadership and the role they play in inducing the preferences that help create and sustain the kind of polity we seek.
What we know
To develop a dynamic theory of effective government that is theoretically compelling and useful for those seeking to improve governmental performance requires us to, first, lay out what we know about the reasons for variation in governments; second,
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clarify the ingredients of an effective government; and, finally, figure out how to move from ineffective to effective government.
Actually, we know a lot. We remain influenced-if sometimes indirectly-by those long-ago debates on "theories of the state." Fortunately, there is less concern now with rather abstract "theories of the state" and more with government, the organization and individuals who establish and administer public policies and laws. Major shifts in the personnel, policies, or even form of government can change while the state remains stable. 6 But those shifts can have significant consequences for the effectiveness of government itself. The officials who staff government are the moving parts of the state.
They are selected and deselected; they can be responsive or innovative.
There is now consensual rejection of the pluralist view of government as a playing field (or perhaps the referee of a playing field) in which various groups duke it out. Government actors are important players in their own right: they affect the rules of the game; they distribute or redistribute political and economic resources; they can dissipate a polity's wealth or enhance it. This is not the government of pluralist theory.
But nor is it the Leviathan of Hobbes.
For Hobbes, the key to an effective government is first, foremost, and solely centralized coercive power in the hands of the monarch. His government was neither part of an inter-state system nor the captive of any particular class or group. Its population was homogeneous, and they were happy to gain security in exchange for their compliance with an authoritarian government. partners in the production of prosperity and equity. It is this last kind of government we hope to achieve. Leviathans and/or bandits simply will not do.
Governments are more effective when they achieve quasi-voluntary compliance, that is, compliance motivated by a willingness to cooperate but backed by coercion. 11 This requires that subjects and citizens receive something from government in return for the extractions government takes from them. It also means that compliance is always conditional It will vary as governments vary in their performance, honesty, attention to due process, and other determinants of government reliability. When government officials become venal, lose their monopoly over force, or prove incapable of extracting needed resources to produce collective goods, non-compliance, resistance, and even state failure are far more likely. A vicious spiral ensues. Governments unable to collect sufficient taxes to pay public officials create incentives for those officials to expropriate "salaries" from citizens and often with force. This in turn leads to the rise of armed gangs as the populace tries to protect itself from their own government. 12 We experience bandits fighting bandits.
We are ever more conscious that the development of effective government is seldom immediate. There is a long learning process during which publics and public officials discover what institutions and which people are reliable and in what settings. The more one develops confidence about others, the more one can then take risks and broaden the range of those productive interactions. Often, the response to insecurity is to develop networks of trust and obligation. However, network-based governance and trade can become more constraint on than facilitator of wide-spread cooperation. 13 Recent political science and political economy offer some hints about how to build productive and secure
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interactions across villages, ethnic groups, and regional divides. 14 We now need to take these findings and make them work in very different contexts.
We have learned how fragile many states and governments are. This is not just an issue of shifting coalitions in parliamentary systems. The deeper problem has to do with factors that undermine the capacity to govern. It seems all too easy to revert to the "war of all against all," and a growing body of work on state failure explains why. 15 The causes are complex, not easily reduced to racial and religious cleavages, diamond mines, or wide-spread poverty, but scholars are successfully sorting out this complexity.
Increasingly, we are also coming to recognize how devastating health and other catastrophes can be, especially when they deplete the revenues and staff of government.
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Even the economically developed and stable democracies have difficulty sustaining effective governments. In the 1970s there was a lot of concern about the "fiscal crisis of the state," 17 that is, that the demand for services by business as well as citizens would far outrun the revenues government could raise. The fiscal crisis is a reality. The poorest among us depend on government services, but so do the rich. 18 Yet, throughout the developed democracies, there is increasing objection to taxes and lobbying effort devoted to passing corporations' expenses onto government. The reduction in revenues is accompanied by rising costs of and need for health, unemployment, and other forms of social insurance.
We know quite a lot about what effective government entails and why states fail.
There are instances of relatively effective and just governments, but we still need the blueprint for how to create and recreate them. Our next step must be to figure out how to keep them from failing, how to rebuild them when they have, and how to ensure that they Levi, p. 9 are responsive and responsible to those they should be serving. We should no longer be satisfied with the Hobbesian solution, a government that provides only security against violence. Our goal is not social order alone but an equitable, just, and democratic government that elicits well-earned support and loyalty from its citizens.
Reorienting our thinking
To build a theory of effective government demands some reorientation of our thinking. Too many of us tend to focus on what we object to about government and not enough on what government does for us. By all means, we should-as good citizens-be critical of particular policies and programs. However, one of the most nefarious effects of the neo-liberal revolution is to ignore how much we all depend on government infrastructure, both physical and social.
There is also insufficient recognition, especially (but not only) among rational choice scholars, that "institutions are structures of power." 19 There is a concern with who wins and who loses and the recognition that collective action is a form of power. But by definition a stable equilibrium is maintained by those with effective bargaining power. If these actors or groups are better off with little or no incentive to change the status quo, the government will not change. Equilibrium analysis of this sort becomes a far more problematic tool once we include all of those encompassed by the government.
Institutions that make some (but not all) better off also create losers, possibly permanent losers. Without recognizing this, we neither fully comprehend the nature of power, nor do we provide for means to compensate the losers.
But even more critical for the research on both the developed and developing world is the inattention to politics, conflicts and clashes that are at the foundation of many we successfully identified all of them or analyzed the reasons for variation in the nature of the bargains among individuals and groups in broadly similar structural positions?
Local groups and power structures shape the choices rulers and institutions make, and their capacity to impose costs on the state varies within as well as across countries.
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Agenda control is most definitely a form of power and at the heart of field-defining work on legislatures, but scholars persist, forty years on, in considering only one "face of power", 22 failing to address the ways in which ideology, non decisions and other forms of "mobilization of bias" keep key questions off the agenda. 23 "Win sets" and heresthetics offer some corrective, but we are struggling-and will be for some time-with questions of how beliefs are formed, preferences induced, and biases mobilized.
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One way out of this conundrum is to use a different approach. We could revive interest in Marxist theory or focus more self-consciously on the "weapons of the weak."
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There is something, indeed quite a lot, to be learned from these perspectives (and others).
Structure does matter, and interpretive explorations of history and cultures teach us how Levi, p. 11 people frame their world and provoke us to think about why they are more likely to act one way than another. But these approaches only help us, it seems to me, if combined with the rigor of formal theory and, when possible, statistical analysis. But even then, there would be lacuna in our theory of government.
The Quandaries
To develop a dynamic theory of effective government requires us to clarify the questions such a theory must answer and then to lay out the essential components or building blocks. Only once these tasks are accomplished can we derive hypotheses, test them, and provide prescriptions based in good logic and evidence.
Any theory of government must come to term with a series of quandaries, captured by the following quotations:
• "…a government strong enough to protect property rights…is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens" 26 (Barry Weingast)
• "…many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others" 27 (Robert Jervis)
• "State formation and consolidation has everywhere extracted horrendous human costs. Despite this, in the modern world it seems that only not having a state is worse than having one" 28 (Pratap Mehta)
• "The existence of the state is essential for economic growth; the state, however, is the source of man-made economic decline" 29 (Douglass North)
• "Distrust may be the problem, but trust is not the solution." 30 (Margaret Levi)
In virtually every state-or government-building project, it is necessary to "tame the violence" 31 within the country's borders, to stop the "roving bandits," and to offer Levi, p. 12 powerful constituents enough in the way of benefits to retain their loyalty and to desist from violent predation. State-building requires ceding to rulers the sine-qua-non of an effective government: the capacity to enforce the laws and extract the taxes necessary to pay for essential public goods. To ensure that the rulers do not then turn around and exploit those they govern requires far more than a "social contract," however. Good government means that government is designed to be effective and efficient on some dimensions and powerless on others, that government actors have access to some resources but not others. But as important as legal constraints are the limits on the bargaining and coercive powers of the governors. However, these significantly inhibit officials' behavior only where institutional arrangements also ensure credible commitments.
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The failure to achieve credible commitments is endemic, in large part because many rulers have no incentives to "tie their hands. Even governments willing to restrain internal warring may not succeed. Part of the explanation derives from the "security dilemma" populations and their leaders face.
Individuals, in their desire for safety in a situation of inadequate government protection, become wary of others, even those with whom they once cooperated.
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behavior is motivated by greed, security dilemmas by fear in contexts where individuals form expectations of threats by others. Security dilemmas can lead to an arms spiral and offensive/defensive warring that makes everyone a potential victim of violence and everyone worse off. Governments, confronting internal violence, may choose to invest even more in their militaries or even arm their allies within the population. The evidence suggests this contributes to rather than reduces the potential for violence. 35 Any resolution of the problem of taming violence and establishing a government among those who are experiencing a security dilemma can be "horrendous." India, the case that inspired this quotation, is unhappily exemplary. The emergence of its postcolonial government was accompanied by religiously based violence that persists unto this day in the form of riots in many states and outright warfare in contested territories such as Kashmir. Partition led to mass killings, devastated families, and the destruction of property and property rights.
On the other hand, we know that effective governments secure property rights, adjudicate disputes, and provide the public goods that enable its citizenry to flourish. But many governments, even those that engender domestic peace and prosperity, are still not doing enough for the populace. By serving special interests, by over regulating the economy, by stomping on civil liberties and rights, by inhibiting scientific and technological progress, government can be oppressive. It can then become a source of economic decline.
Because so many governments engage in venality and corruption or actually harm the personal and professional lives of citizens, there are good reasons to distrust government. Such distrust is in fact a healthy reaction when it produces legal Levi, p. 14 frameworks, checks and balances, and vigilant citizens. Indeed, distrust often generates institutional change and creation: "Good defenses make good neighbors." 36 We do not need to trust our government or our designated leaders or our fellow citizens. Rather, we demand assurances that they will do their duty by us and be caught and punished if they do not.
But seldom, especially in the modern and democratic world, is confidence in a government officialdom based solely on the extent to which it secures property rights and refrains from predation. Confidence also depends on the extent to which each citizen is assured that all others are being held to the same legal obligations; and the extent to which citizens generally believe they are getting something in return for their compliance. 37 These are the key factors for producing quasi-voluntary compliance, a defining characteristic of effective government.
A government that holds all to the same obligations is one that possesses the capacity and the will to do so, qualities which are a function of on whom government is dependent. If the selectorate is narrow and the minimum winning coalition tiny, then government is more likely to have discriminatory regulations and extractions. 38 If there are constituents able to blackmail government by means of their control of resources, they are likely to get favorable treatment. They are also more able to call the shots without holding the offices. To summarize, we require models of the means to:
• Tame Where this discussion leaves us is with a laundry list of processes to be addressed by a theory of effective government creation and stability. We already possess models and rather compelling arguments about how many of these processes develop. Yet, some ingredients are missing if the cake is going to rise.
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Essential ingredients
In baking our cake, we must be attentive to empirical evidence, reality, and good science, sensitive to the details and particularities of context and history, and committed to improving our common lot. We must recognize the role of human agency. With these guidelines in place, we can now begin to consider the essential ingredients of an effective government, even if we have not yet succeeded in synthesizing them into a dynamic theory. These ingredients are:
• Institutional arrangements that appropriately align incentives
• Leadership that can enable government to deliver security and services to the What is also required is leadership with the capacity to enforce the laws, the competence to produce public goods the public demands, and the facility to evoke popular confidence even among those who disagree with particular policies. Leadership aligns incentives, helps design and redesign institutions, provides the learning environment that enables individuals to transform or revise beliefs, and plays a major role in inducing preferences. Most importantly, leadership-both of government and within civil society-provides the human agency that coordinates the efforts of others.
Leadership empowered by institutions and popular support, but it also curbed by them. It operates within a set of constraints, and our theories must reveal what sets of constraints are most likely to facilitate able leadership. There is considerable rhetoric that representative democracy is the best design for effective government. The evidence remains mixed, given that there are so many democracies that are unstable or poor.
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Nonetheless, leaders subject to relatively well-functioning electoral systems are more likely to be responsive to a wider range of constituents, and there is good reason to believe that they are more able to produce peace and prosperity. 43 But it is a tricky business. Representatives and executives elected on one platform may do something quite different once in office. Sometimes they do so because of unexpected wars, natural Levi, p. 18 catastrophes, epidemics, or economic shifts, sometimes because of new information acquired on the job, and sometimes because they simply lied on the campaign trail. How to hold them accountable comes back in part to institutional arrangements, but it is an also an effect of the confidence they are able to evoke among the citizenry. If confidence is high, then there is considerably more discretion to change course as circumstances require. 44 At issue is under what conditions members of a polity develop and retain confidence in those to whom they have delegated authority and who now have considerable coercive power relative to them. Credible commitments and other incentive structures play a role, but here is where the quality of leadership emerges as an important attribute of effective government. Leaders establish a set of principles that constitute the identity of the governmental organization and institute the rules to guide behavior in the face of unforeseen contingencies. 45 For these principles to constitute the basis of an effective government with a supportive polity, they must be communicated to all and their implementation observable post hoc. Governmental leaders establish reliability through reputations built on these principles. They sustain their reputation and that of the government by upholding these principles even when they are not the most organizationally efficient or in the personally best interests of the leaders. Democracy, we know, is not efficient, and some of our most revered public leaders have made great personal sacrifices.
We are describing here a kind of culture, a governmental culture. It is initiated and reinforced at critical moments in history when a leadership cohort solves the critical strategic problems of recruiting support, coordinating resources, and ably managing If the public and officials believe there is widespread corruption, they are likely to sustain dishonesty unless government can actually change the beliefs as well as the practice. On the other hand, if they believe the system is clean, they are more likely to resist, reveal, and punish instances of corruption. Leadership can provide the information and the example to influence what people believe about the system they are in.
Effective governments constrain officials to behave in certain ways, but they also may encourage officials to prefer certain outcomes over others and to exclude some possible actions altogether (such as stealing from the public coffers). Engaged citizens in well-ordered democracies may come to prefer to vote and become informed and vigilant rather than free ride or stay rationally ignorant. Those who blow the whistle on corruption may believe they are in a clean equilibrium, but they are also willing to act, preferring to pay the costs of involvement.
So how do leaders and other governments induce preferences for democracy, social justice, peaceful adjudication of disputes, and other objectives that make effective government viable? If we cannot answer that question, we are left-once again-with a static theory. While it is interesting to note variation in preferences, we need to know their origin.
Experimental research, survey evidence, and behavioral economics offer compelling findings that many individuals are motivated by concerns about fairness and reciprocity. 49 They knowingly choose actions that will produce an outcome they consider more just or fair over one that gives them the greatest material return. Perhaps this predisposition results from evolution 50 or some other factor outside of immediate human control.
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However, the probability of acting on such a predisposition clearly varies in response to context and expectations of how others are likely to act. There is a social and political basis for at least some of the variation. Networks 51 or institutions 52 can generate, sustain or even induce preferences by making some outcomes accessible that might not otherwise be.
There are several aspects of institutional arrangements that permit individuals to act on their preferences. A backdrop of enforcement empowers officials who want to be honest and citizens who want to do their duty. These individuals prefer to be one kind of person rather than another, but they will behave according to type only if they feel confident that others will pay their share and that the bureaucrats will not be corrupt. I have now presented the components that are essential to the construction and maintenance of an effective government. I have identified mechanisms by which at least some of those components can-and have-come into being. Human agency, through leadership, learning, preference formation, and wide-spread constituent support, provides the yeast, the missing ingredient of a dynamic theory of effective government. Yet, we still lack the recipe or recipes that transform these elements into a government that fulfills its population, all of its population, while also reproducing itself regularly and without destructive trauma. We are still in the world of comparing and adjusting different equilibria rather than moving from one to another. The accumulation of knowledge and research is now at the point where we can foresee the emergence of a dynamic theory of effective government. This is our challenge as social scientists-and our next frontier!
